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Abstract 
Wage subsidies are commonly used to assist disadvantaged jobseekers into employment. If effective they can contribute 
to reducing long-term benefit dependence. The study examines the impact of wage subsidies on assisted jobseekers and 
on the firms that employ them. It focuses on hiring subsidies granted over the period of January 2003 to December 
2007 and outcomes up to December 2010, and draws on administrative and tax data held by Statistics New Zealand as 
part of the ‘Integrated Data Infrastructure’ prototype. Outcomes for assisted jobseekers are compared to those of 
comparable jobseekers using propensity matching methods.  Similarly, propensity-matching is used to compare 
employment and earnings growth in firms that hire subsidised workers to growth in otherwise comparable firms.  
Overall we find that starting a subsidised job leads to significant employment and earning benefits for assisted 
jobseekers over several years. Subsidised workers are disproportionately hired into expanding firms, though we cannot 
determine whether the expansion would have occurred in the absence of the subsidy. 
Introduction 
This study examines the impact of wage subsidies on 
assisted jobseekers and on the firms that employ them. It 
focuses on hiring subsidies granted over the period of 
January 2003 to December 2007 and outcomes up to 
December 2010.  
Previous studies in New Zealand have found that wage 
subsidies are effective in moving jobseekers out of 
unemployment (Maré 2002) or off benefit (Johri et al. 
2004; de Boer 2003). Survey evidence (Department of 
Labour 1985; New Zealand Employment Service 1994) 
suggests that wage subsidies improve the subsequent 
employment prospects of assisted jobseekers 
The key original contributions of the current study are 
twofold. First, it extends previous New Zealand studies of 
the impact of subsidies on jobseeker outcomes by 
examining the impacts on subsequent employment and 
earnings, in addition to the impacts on subsequent benefit 
receipt and unemployment. Second, it presents evidence 
on the impacts of wage subsidies on employment in the 
firms that hire subsidised workers. It thus provides 
evidence on whether the gains for assisted jobseekers are 
achieved by placing them in previously filled jobs or in 
new jobs. 
Our study makes use of data from Statistics New 
Zealand’s Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI), prototype 
which contains relevant administrative and survey 
information for a broad set of New Zealand workers and 
firms. This enables us to estimate the impacts of wage 
subsidies by comparing outcomes for assisted workers 
and firms with those of comparison groups with similar 
characteristics. Comparison groups are defined using the 
method of propensity score matching. 
Background 
Most wage subsidy evaluations focus on the impact of the 
subsidy on the prospects of the subsidised worker. This 
focus is appropriate given that the primary aim of wage 
subsidy policies is generally to help unemployed 
jobseekers into work. 
These gains may, however, come at the cost of other 
workers or jobseekers. Effective design and delivery of 
wage subsidy programmes seeks to limit the costs of 
subsidies, which take the form of direct deadweight costs 
and indirect costs in the form of substitution or 
displacement effects. Deadweight costs arise when a 
subsidy is paid to a jobseeker who would have gained 
employment anyway, or who would have gained 
employment with a lesser subsidy. Managing eligibility 
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for subsidies and negotiating the subsidy amount and 
duration can lower the risk of deadweight costs. 
Substitution effects arise when the subsidised jobseeker 
fills a job that would otherwise have been filled by an 
unsubsidised worker. Unless subsidies can induce firms 
to increase employment, a degree of substitution is an 
unavoidable cost of achieving gains for subsidised 
jobseekers.  
It is possible that a wage subsidy programme can induce 
firms to expand their employment, if for example the 
subsidy amount more than compensates the employer for 
the lower productivity of the subsidised worker at the 
time of hiring, and they may be willing to retain the 
formerly subsidised worker because doing so does not 
entail any hiring costs, and because the worker may have 
acquired relevant skills while subsidised. 
A subsidy may make the employer willing to hire, or to 
bring forward a possible future hiring,1 by covering hiring 
and training costs, or by compensating them for taking 
the risk of hiring when there is uncertainty about future 
demand or about the productivity of a particular 
applicant. 
There are relatively few studies that, like ours, examine 
the impact of subsidies on firm employment using a rich 
microdata panel. A number of earlier studies relied on 
surveys of firms to ascertain the extent of substitution or 
deadweight effects (for example, Department of Labour 
1985; see also the summaries in Calmfors et al. 2001 and 
OECD 1993). These survey-based studies generally found 
substantial deadweight effects (60 percent of subsidised 
workers would have been employed anyway) and 
substitution effects (of the remaining 40 percent, 25/40 
gain employment at the expense of other workers). The 
net expansion of employment is thus only about 5 to 10 
percent of the number of subsidised workers (Maré 2005). 
In contrast, more recent matching estimates using firm 
microdata find more substantial positive effects of 
subsidised employment on total employment at the firm. 
Using a similar matching approach to ours, and 
administrative data on firm employment in Denmark, 
Rotger and Arendt (2010) estimate the impact on 
employment 7 months after the start of a subsidy, when 
most subsidies are ended. Firms that had hired a 
subsidised worker have 0.26 more employees than in 
otherwise comparable firms. A related Finnish paper by 
Kangasharju (2007), reports that firms that took on 
subsidised workers increased their payroll by around 9 
percent relative to a matched comparison group. The 
author interprets this as evidence that subsidies lead to 
increases in total employment. The results are, however, 
                                                 
1 Department of Labour (1985) reported that 65% of 
subsidised placements arose from employers bringing 
forward future hiring. At the time, this was seen as 
evidence of strong deadweight costs—with the subsidy 
paying employers to do what they would have done 
anyway, which was influential in reducing the use of 
wage subsidies in the late 1980s. 
also consistent with the take-up of subsidies being 
concentrated in expanding firms.  
Wage subsidy programmes 
There were a numbers of different subsidy programmes 
operating over the January 2003 to December 2007 
period that we examine. About 12,500 subsidies were 
paid in 2003, decreasing to about 6,200 in 2007.  The 
main programme over this period was called Job Plus 
which was a hiring subsidy paid to assist disadvantaged 
jobseekers to secure permanent employment, and 
accounted for 37,400 of the 46,500 subsidies paid over 
the period.   Job Plus Training (3,400) enabled clients to 
undertake specific training required for an identified job 
opportunity. Job Connection (1,600) is a work experience 
subsidy2 targeted to those who have been unemployed for 
more than 4 years. In 2007 Job Plus, Job Plus Training, 
and Job Connection were consolidated into a single 
programme called Skills Investment Subsidy.  
The Job Plus wage subsidy programme was administered 
by the New Zealand Employment Service, and then by 
Work & Income, between 1993 and 2007. It was a 
targeted subsidy programme aimed at disadvantaged 
jobseekers. The main, but not only, criterion for 
disadvantage was having been registered as unemployed 
for at least 6 months. The duration and amount of the 
subsidy was negotiated by the case manager and the 
employer. In most cases the duration of subsidy was for 
26 weeks, although it could be up to 52 weeks.  
Job Plus subsidies were paid to employers who employed 
particular jobseekers in permanent, full-time jobs. A pro 
rata subsidy could be paid for work-tested beneficiaries 
working 15–30 hours per week.  
In 1999, the subsidy amount was capped at $11,000 per 
participant per year, which equates to $214 per person per 
week for up to 52 weeks. Over the 2003 to 2007 the 
average subsidy was about $200 to $250 per week, while 
the median gross earnings while employed for subsidised 
workers in the 2 years prior to subsidy receipt was around 
$430 per week, in June 2005 dollars. Subsidies were paid 
for about 50,000 jobs over this period, at an average cost 
of $3,000. 
Jobseekers could secure subsidised jobs in a number of 
ways. In some cases, employment advisors or case 
managers would negotiate with an employer prior to a 
jobseeker being referred to a posted vacancy. 
Employment advisors could also negotiate with 
employers who had not posted a vacancy, to encourage 
them to hire a subsidised jobseeker. Jobseekers could also 
apply for vacancies and inform prospective employers 
that employing the jobseeker would attract a subsidy 
payment. The operational principles guiding the delivery 
                                                 
2 Work experience subsidies differ from hiring subsidies 
(like Job Plus) in that the employer is under no obligation 
to continue to employ the participant at the end of the 
subsidy period.  
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of the programme required that the subsidy only 
compensate the employer for the extra costs of 
employment incurred by employing a disadvantaged 
jobseeker; that subsidised jobseekers should not replace 
existing employees; and that subsidies should not provide 
employers with a competitive advantage. Overall, the 
design and implementation of the programme favoured 
placing subsidised jobseekers into existing vacancies.  
An evaluation of Job Plus was undertaken in 1994 (New 
Zealand Employment Service 1994). A sample of 400 
subsidy recipients was interviewed 6 months after their 
subsidy ended. Information was collected on the length of 
their subsidy and on their employment experiences during 
and after the period of the subsidy. Almost half (44 
percent) of subsidy recipients reported receiving a 
subsidy for fewer than 6 months. Six months after the 
subsidy ended, 39 percent of recipients reported that they 
were still employed at the firm in which they had 
received subsidised employment.  
The current paper provides the first examination of the 
impact of Job Plus on the firms that hired the subsidised 
workers. 
Data 
We use data from the Statistics New Zealand prototype 
IDI dataset. This dataset contains information on benefit 
dynamics and active labour market policies, linked 
employer–employee data (LEED) on monthly 
employment and earnings derived from tax data, and 
information on firms’ industry and location from the 
Statistics New Zealand Longitudinal Business Frame.  
Monthly employment and earnings data are available 
from April 1999 until December 2010. We focus on 
subsidy spells that started between January 2003 and 
December 2007, to ensure that we have 3 years of prior 
and subsequent job information, covering January 2000 to 
December 2010. We also report longer-term outcomes for 
jobseekers who receive early in our study period. 
The dataset includes main benefit payments (which are 
taxable) but not second or third tier benefit payments (like 
the accommodation supplement and hardship grants) 
Hence it is not possible to determine the total amount of 
benefits an individual received in any month. 
For each person who receives a wage subsidy, the dataset 
contains information on the start date and the estimated 
duration over which the subsidy was paid. Information on 
the amount of subsidy paid or the identity of the employer 
is not included. The information on start date is 
considered to be more reliable than end date. We use 
administrative data on programme participation to 
identify all those who started a subsidised job between 
January 2003 and December 2007. This was about 60,000 
people, most of whom received one subsidy over the 5-
year period. We treat subsidy spells separated by less than 
30 days as a single spell which reduces the number of 
spells from 66,595 to 59,985.  
We use the linked data to identify those jobseekers who 
start a new job-spell around the time recorded in the 
administrative data. We match each subsidy start to the 
closest job-spell start within a given window. A match is 
made if the job-spell started in the same calendar month, 
up to 3 months before, or 1 month after the administrative 
start date. We don’t include matches where the job-spell 
starts 2 or 3 months after that recorded in the 
administrative data because of the possibility that the 
jobseeker starts an unsubsidised job rather than a 
subsidised one at that time, whereas it seems unlikely that 
a jobseeker would receive a wage subsidy if they already 
have a job.  In total, 46,469 subsidy spell starts are 
matched to a job start.  It seems that a significant minority 
of jobseekers do not start the subsidised job as arranged.  
The main study population is further restricted to those 
who had received benefits at some stage during the 12 
months before the reference subsidy spell, and had not 
received a wage subsidy in the prior 6 months.  
For the firm-based analysis, the unit of analysis is an 
enterprise, which may operate in more than one location. 
We apply some repairs to enterprise records, joining 
continuing enterprises that appear to have ceased, using 
the algorithm in Fabling (2011). We use financial 
information about firms from the Longitudinal Business 
Database, drawing on information from survey and 
administrative sources. From the available financial 
information, we are able to derive a measure of 
productivity for about a third of enterprises. 
Impacts of jobseekers 
Method 
The impact of starting a subsidised job on subsequent 
outcomes is estimated using the method of propensity 
matching. Jobseekers are matched to similar jobseekers 
who did not start a subsidised job, on the basis of the 
estimated probability of starting a subsidised job. 
Differences in subsequent benefit, employment, and 
earnings of the treated and matched jobseekers indicate 
the impact of starting a subsidised job on subsequent 
employment and earnings. The method is implemented in 
three stages.  
First, a pool of potential matches is identified for each 
calendar month, referred to as the reference month. We 
classify all jobseekers who start a subsidised job in the 
month as part of the ‘treatment group’. A ‘potential 
comparison group’ contains all other jobseekers.  
Table 13 compares the demographic characteristics, and 
employment and benefit history of the 39,885 participants 
in our study population with a 1 percent random sample 
of non-participants in each calendar month. About two-
thirds of participants were receiving the Unemployment 
Benefit before they started the subsidised job, with one-
                                                 
3 Tables and Figures are included in attached appendices 
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third receiving other benefits. About 20 percent had been 
receiving benefit for less than 3 months when they started 
the subsidised job and 33 percent had been receiving 
benefit for 6 or more of the previous 10 years. 
Participants are more likely than non-participants to be on 
the unemployment benefit, male, young, Māori, and to 
have no school qualifications. They also have lower 
average duration on-benefit than the non-participants. 
Second, we estimate a logistic regression model to obtain 
a predicted probability for each jobseeker of starting a 
subsidised job. The probability of treatment is modelled 
as a function of past benefit history, employment patterns, 
and demographic and other characteristics recorded in the 
administrative data.  A separate logistic regression model 
is estimated for each type of main benefit, pooled across 
years. For those receiving the Unemployment Benefit, 
separate regressions are estimated by year. The regression 
models are estimated on a sample comprising all 
members of the treatment group, and a 10 percent sample 
of other jobseekers. Predicted probabilities are derived for 
all members of the treatment and comparison groups, and 
are referred to as ‘propensity scores’, following the 
terminology of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
The third stage of the method is to match each treated 
jobseeker to a subset of similar comparison jobseekers. 
Matches are made only between jobseekers observed in 
the same reference month, and of the same sex, ethnicity, 
age class, and benefit type and duration class, to facilitate 
subsequent subgroup comparisons. Within those 
constraints, each treated jobseeker is matched to five 
comparison group jobseekers with the closest values of 
the propensity score. Those comparisons that are matched 
at least once are referred to as the ‘matched comparison 
group’. 
We drop individuals who have no comparators or those 
with propensity scores outside the region of common 
support. These restrictions reduce the number of subsidy 
starts from 39,885 to 38,808, a match rate of 97.3 percent. 
The total number of jobseekers in the matched 
comparison group is 182,223. This three-stage matching 
method serves to balance the average characteristics of 
the treatment and matched groups. 
Results 
Figure 1 plots various measures for participants and 
matched comparisons in the 36 months before and 36 
months after the reference month (that is, the month 
participants started a subsidised job). We consider the 
proportion receiving benefits or subsidies (panel a), the 
proportion employed and off-benefit (panel b), the 
proportion employed, including both subsidised and 
unsubsidised employment (panel d), the proportion 
neither employed nor in receipt of benefits (panel e) and 
the proportion receiving a wage subsidy (f).   
The wage subsidy usually lasts up to 7 calendar months, 
with only 5 percent receiving a longer subsidy. 
Differences in outcomes between participants and 
comparisons were greatest around 7 months, with 
participants much less likely to be receiving benefits, and 
more likely to be in unsubsidised employment.  
Subsidised jobs usually last longer than the subsidy. 
About 58 percent of subsidised jobs continue after the 
subsidy ends, with 28 percent lasting at least 6 more. Jobs 
are more likely to continue after a longer subsidy spell. 
Following a 6-month subsidy, 56 percent of jobs last a 
further 6 months.  
Twelve months after starting a subsidised job, 34 percent 
of participants are receiving benefits or wage subsidy, 
compared to 58 percent of matched comparisons (panel 
a). Fifty-two percent of participants are off-benefit and in 
unsubsidised employment, compared to 26 percent of 
matched comparisons.  
Although differences between participants and 
comparisons decline gradually from around 7 months, 
large differences remain 36 months after starting a 
subsidised job. Thirty-six percent of participants receive 
benefits or a wage subsidy, compared to 45 percent of 
matched comparisons. Forty-five percent of participants 
are off-benefit and in unsubsidised employment, 
compared to 32 percent of matched comparisons.   
Overall, participants are 13.0 percent more likely to be 
employed 36 months later, 10.2 percent less likely to be 
receiving benefit, and spend 6.1 more months employed, 
5.0 fewer months receiving benefit, and earn $20,150 
more over the following three years than matched 
comparisons. 
Table 2 also contains estimated impacts on various 
outcomes measures, for different demographic subgroups.  
Overall, positive impacts are evident for all subgroups 
defined by previous benefit receipt or by demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender and ethnicity. 
Impacts on firms 
Method 
As for the analysis of jobseeker outcomes, the impact on 
a firm of hiring a subsidised worker is estimated using the 
method of propensity matching. Firms employing a 
subsidised worker are matched to a subset of similar 
firms, where similarity is defined on the basis of the 
estimated likelihood of taking on a subsidised worker. 
Differences in subsequent employment growth of the 
treated and matched firms indicate the impact of hiring a 
subsidised worker. The method is implemented in three 
stages.  
First, a pool of potential matches is identified for each 
calendar month, referred to as the reference month.  
Second, we estimate a logistic regression model to obtain 
a predicted probability for each firm of hiring a 
subsidised worker. The probability of treatment is 
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modelled as a function of past employment patterns, 
recent workforce composition, industry, and region. A 
separate logistic regression model is estimated for each 
calendar year, and within year, by firm size4. The 
regression models are estimated on a sample comprising 
all members of the treatment group, and a 40 percent 
sample of other firms. Predicted probabilities are derived 
for all members of the treatment and comparison groups.  
The third stage of the method is to match each treated 
firm to a subset of similar comparison firms. Matches are 
made only between firms observed in the same reference 
month and of the same size class. Within those 
constraints, each treated firm is matched to five 
comparison group firms with the closest values of the 
propensity score.  
This three-stage matching method serves to balance the 
average characteristics of the treatment and matched 
comparison groups.  
We focus attention on firms that hire one or more 
subsidised workers between January 2003 and December 
2007. We restrict attention to subsidy starts in firms that 
have been employing continually for 3 months prior to 
taking on a subsidised worker. This excludes around 15 
percent of subsidy starts during the period.  
Our main impact estimates are based on for firms with 
average employment of 50 or less in the year prior to the 
reference month.  We exclude larger firms, as it is more 
difficult to separate the relatively small influence of 
hiring a subsidised worker from general employment 
variation across time and across firms.   
We observe 27,780 monthly observations on enterprises 
(‘enterprise-months’) for months in which one or more 
subsidised workers start an employment spell. Overall, 
30,363 employees within these firms started a subsidised 
job during the period. There are 7,974,600 potential 
comparison observations. The firms that take on 
subsidised workers have different characteristics from 
those that do not. Some key differences are summarised 
in Table 3. Treated firms are larger than the average 
comparison firm. They have average employment of 11.3 
workers, compared with 6.1 for the potential comparison 
group. They also have higher employment growth, higher 
turnover, and are slightly younger. A higher share of their 
workforce is young or male, or has monthly earnings 
below the lower quartile. There are also differences in the 
geographic location and industry composition of treated 
and comparison firms. Subsidies are disproportionately 
high in construction services, food and beverage services, 
and food product manufacturing, and low, in agriculture 
                                                 
4 We undertook a supplementary analysis in which we control for firms’ production 
histories. Treated firms not only have higher employment, but also have larger capital 
and intermediate inputs, compared with potential comparison firms, but were slightly less 
productive than comparison firms. Taking these differences into account improves the 
credibility of our impact estimates, although in practice these were very similar to our 
main estimates.  
 
and in the professional, scientific, and technical services 
industries.   
In the matching stage, we drop firms for which we have 
no suitable comparators. This reduces the number of 
treated firms to 27,597 and the number of subsidy starts 
to 30,123. 
Results 
In our analysis sample of treated and potential 
comparison group firms, the total number of subsidised 
jobs in any month declined from around 4,000 in 2003/04 
to around 2,500 in 2007. Around one-third of subsidies 
were in firms that were hiring a new subsidised worker in 
the month. 
Most firms hire only one new subsidised worker at a time, 
and employ only a few subsidised workers during the 
2003–2007 period. In a month where a subsidy starts, 
firms on average take on 1.2 subsidised workers. 
However, 90 percent of firms take on only one subsidised 
worker at a time. The average is higher due to a relatively 
small number of (mainly larger) firms taking on multiple 
subsidised workers. About 65 percent firms who hire a 
new subsidised worker between 2003 and 2007 only ever 
take on one subsidised worker, with a further 17 percent 
only ever taking on two workers, which is close to the 
average of 2.1 workers.  
We focus on employment outcomes for the firm. The 
main measure that we use is a count of total employment 
within a firm in each of the 36 months following the start 
of a subsidy spell. We also track the number of subsidised 
jobs in the firm, and the retention of previously 
subsidised workers. 
Figure 2 provides a graphical summary of how the 
impacts are identified and estimated. The upper panel of 
Figure 2 plots mean employment for the treatment and 
comparison groups. The potential comparison group 
(dashed line) has slower growth than the treatment group 
in the 36 months prior to the reference month, and lower 
mean employment in the reference month. Identification 
relies on matching treatment and comparison firms that 
on average have similar employment growth and firm 
birth and death patterns. The figure shows clearly that the 
prior employment growth for the matched comparison 
group closely matches that of the treatment group. The 
two lines are indistinguishable on the graph. After the 
reference month, however, the mean employment levels 
of the two groups diverge markedly. The difference in 
employment levels between the treatment group and the 
matched comparison group is the estimate of the impact 
of subsidised hiring (effect of treatment on the treated). 
The middle panel of Figure 2 plots the vertical distance 
between the bold ‘treatment group’ line in the upper panel 
and the corresponding ‘matched comparison group’ line. 
This is the ‘average effect of treatment on the treated’ 
(ATT), and is shown in the figure as a solid bold line. 
Prior to the reference month, the effect is close to zero. In 
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the reference month, the effect rises sharply to 1.39 
additional employees. The dotted lines in the middle 
panel show 95 percent confidence intervals for the 
average effect of treatment on the treated.5 The difference 
is significantly different from zero throughout the follow-
up period of 36 months. 
The lower panel of Figure 2 plots the same ATT line for 
total employment, together with lines showing the 
difference between the treatment and matched 
comparison firms in the number of subsidised workers 
and formerly subsidised workers employed in the firm 
each month. The immediate employment impact (month 
0) is larger than the average number of subsidy starts in 
that month, which is 1.09 for firms with mean 
employment of 50 or less. The faster growth in 
employment among treated firms relative to the matched 
comparison group is not due entirely to the hiring of 
subsidised workers. The first row of Table 4 summarises 
the key patterns in Figure 2. Mean employment for the 
treatment group in the month prior to hiring a subsidised 
worker is 11.7. By construction, the treatment and 
comparison groups have the same prior employment 
level. The treatment group, however, uses subsidised 
workers more intensively even prior to the subsidy start 
that defines the reference month. On average, they 
employ 0.2 more subsidised employees than the firms in 
the matched comparison group. This necessarily implies 
that the treatment group has a lower level of unsubsidised 
employment prior to treatment. 
In the reference month, the treatment group firms hire, on 
average, 1.09 subsidised workers, and have total 
employment that is 1.39 employees higher than in 
comparison firms. The fourth column of Table 4 shows 
that the additional expansion is largely due to the hiring 
of 0.48 other (non-subsidised) workers. The fact that the 
treated firms hire 1.57 more employees than the 
comparison group, but have employment that is only 1.39 
higher, implies that the treatment group have a slightly 
higher rate of job separations. The substantial net increase 
in employment indicates, however, that firms taking on 
subsidised workers are not simply substituting subsidised 
workers for unsubsidised workers. There is a difference in 
employment between the matched treatment and 
comparison groups even 36 months after the reference 
month, which is evident in Figure 3 and in the final 
columns of Table 4. The effect of treatment on the 
treatment group is 0.82 additional employees 12 months 
after the subsidised hiring, and remains substantial even 
after 36 months, at 0.52.  
The lighter solid line in the lower panel of Figure 4 plots 
the difference between the treatment and comparison 
groups in their use of subsidised workers. The dashed line 
shows the treatment–comparison difference in the 
employment of workers who were previously employed 
                                                 
5 Standard errors are calculated from 100 bootstrap 
replications over the population of firms, with block 
selection of each firm’s entire history. Within each 
replication, an independent random sample is chosen for 
estimation of the propensity score. 
with a subsidy. The implications of the fact that jobs last 
longer than the associated subsidy are clearly evident. In 
the months after the reference month, the number of 
subsidised workers declines, as subsidies come to an end. 
There is, however, an accompanying increase in the 
employment of workers remaining after the end of their 
subsidy. The employment of formerly subsidised workers 
accounts for about 70 percent of the treatment effect after 
12 months, and about half of the treatment effect 36 
months after the subsidy starts.  
The pattern of estimated impacts is fairly consistent 
across different firm size classes. For small firms 
(average employment of 5 or less), the impact on total 
employment is smaller than the number of subsidised 
workers who are hired, despite the positive contribution 
of other hires. This implies that there is some substitution 
of subsidised workers for unsubsidised workers, possibly 
due to difficulties in making fine adjustments to 
employment when the number of employees is small. 
Substitution is not evident for firms with average 
employment of more than 5.  
Consistent with the recent studies by Rotger and Arendt 
(2010) and Kangasharju (2007), we find that firms hiring 
subsidised workers increase their total employment 
relative to a sample of otherwise similar firms when they 
take on subsidised workers. Subsidised workers are not 
merely claiming subsidies to fill jobs that were previously 
filled by unsubsidised workers.  
We estimate that the employment of unsubsidised 
workers actually increases when subsidised workers are 
hired. Most small to medium firms (50 or fewer 
employees) hiring subsidised workers take on only one 
subsidised worker at a time. On average, the number of 
subsidised workers hired in a month in these ‘treated’ 
firms is 1.09. Compared with employment changes 
among a group of matched comparison firms, 
employment in treated firms increases by 1.39 in the 
subsidy-start month, and is accompanied by a 
comparatively large hiring of unsubsidised workers (0.48 
higher).  
There is some evidence of weak substitution for very 
small firms (5 or fewer employees). For firms with 
average employment of 2 or fewer in the previous year, 
subsidised hires in the month of hiring average 1.04, yet 
total employment increases by only 0.96 employees, 
despite hiring more unsubsidised workers than 
comparable firms. At least some of these very small firms 
decrease their employment of unsubsidised workers when 
they hire a subsidised worker.  
Treated firms continue to have higher employment levels 
than matched comparison firms for at least 36 months 
after a subsidy hire, although the size of the difference 
declines over time. The retention of subsidised workers 
after the end of their subsidy contributes significantly to 
the employment effect. The expansion of employment 
does not appear to be due to firms paying lower wages. 
The differences in average monthly earnings between the 
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treatment and comparison groups are small and generally 
insignificant. 
It seems likely that subsidised workers are filling at least 
some of the vacancies that would have been filled 
anyway. We are unable to distinguish this from the 
possibility that subsidies are effective in inducing firms to 
expand employment beyond what they would have 
chosen otherwise, or to bring forward future employment 
growth by hiring a subsidised worker at the same time as 
they are actively hiring unsubsidised workers. 
Conclusions 
Overall we find that starting a subsidised job leads to 
significant employment and earning benefits for assisted 
jobseekers over several years, and that the positive 
impacts are evident for all subgroups defined by previous 
benefit receipt or by demographic characteristics such as 
age, gender, and ethnicity. Subsidised workers are 
disproportionately hired into expanding firms, though we 
cannot determine whether the expansion would have 
occurred in the absence of the subsidy.  
References 
Calmfors, L., Forslund, A., & Hemström, M. (2001). 
Does active labour market policy work? Lessons 
from the Swedish experience. Swedish Economic 
Policy Review, 8, 61-124. 
Crichton, S., & Maré, D. C. (2012). The impacts of 
wage subsidies on jobseekers’ outcomes and firm 
employment. Wellington: Ministry of Business, 
Innovation & Employment. 
de Boer, M. (2003). Estimating the impact of employment 
programmes on participants' outcomes. 
Wellington: CSRE, Ministry of Social 
Development. 
Department of Labour. (1985). Studies of employment 
and training programmes. Wellington: NZ 
Department of Labour. 
Fabling, R. (2011, 11-01). Keeping it together: Tracking 
firms in New Zealand's Longitudinal Business 
Database. Motu Working Paper 11-01. 
Fabling, R., & Maré, D. C. (2012). Cyclical labour 
market adjustment in New Zealand: The response 
of firms to the global financial crisis and its 
implications for workers. Motu Working Paper 12-
04. 
Heckman, J., Lalonde, R., & Smith, J. (1999). The 
economics and econometrics of active labour 
market programs. In O. a. Ashenfelter, Handbook 
of Labor Economics: Vol 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science. 
Johri, R., de Boer, M., Pusch, H., Ramasamy, S., & 
Wong, K. (2004). Evidence to date on the working 
and effectiveness of ALMPs in New Zealand. 
Wellington: Department of Labour and Ministry of 
Social Development. 
Kangasharju, A. (2007). Do wage subsidies increase 
employment in subsidized firms? Economica 74, 
51-67. 
Maré, D. C. (2002). The impact of employment policy 
interventions. Labour Market Bulletin 2000-2002, 
57-100. 
Maré, D. C. (2005). Indirect effects of active labour 
market policies. Motu Working Paper 05-01. 
NZ Employment Service. (1994). Evaluating the 
effectiveness of Job Plus. Wellington: Operations 
and Policy, NZ Employment Service. 
OECD. (1993). Chapter 2: Active labour market policies: 
Assessing macroeconomic and microeconomic 
effects. In Employment Outlook 1993 (pp. 39-80). 
Paris: OECD. 
Rosenbaum, P., & Rubin, D. (1983). The central role of 
the propensity score in observational studies for 
causal effects. Biometrika 70(1), 41-55. 
Rotger, G. P., & Arendt, J. N. (2010). The effect of a 
wage subsidy on employment of the subsdised 
firm. AKF Working Paper, 2010(14). 
Disclaimer 
This paper was undertaken while the authors were on 
secondment to Statistics New Zealand. The results in this 
paper are not official statistics, they have been created for 
research purposes from the Integrated Data Infrastructure 
(IDI) prototype managed by Statistics NZ. The opinions, 
findings, recommendations and conclusions expressed in 
this are those of the authors.  Statistics NZ and the 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment take 
no responsibility for any omissions or errors in the 
information contained here. 
 Access to the data used in this study was provided by 
Statistics NZ in accordance with security and 
confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. Only 
people authorised by the Statistics Act 1975 are allowed 
to see data about a particular person, business or 
organisation. Careful consideration has been given to the 
privacy, security and confidentiality issues associated 
with using administrative data in the IDI prototype. 
Further detail can be found in the Privacy impact 
assessment for the Integrated Data Infrastructure 
available from www.stats.govt.nz. The results in this 
paper have been confidentialised to protect individual 
people and businesses from identification. 
The results are based in part on tax data supplied by 
Inland Revenue to Statistics NZ under the Tax 
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Administration Act 1994. This tax data must be used only 
for statistical purposes, and no individual information 
may be published or disclosed in any other form, or 
provided to Inland Revenue for administrative or 
regulatory purposes. 
 Any person who has had access to the unit-record data 
has certified that they have been shown, have read, and 
have understood section 81 of the Tax Administration Act 
1994, which relates to secrecy. Any discussion of data 
limitations or weaknesses is in the context of using the 
IDI prototype for statistical purposes, and is not related to 
the data's ability to support Inland Revenue's core 
operational requirements  
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Figure 1: Jobseeker analysis: Selected outcomes for participants and matched comparisons 
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Figure 2: Firm analysis: Outcomes for treatment and comparison groups (for firms with mean annual 
employment 50 or less) 
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Note: Figures have been derived from the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI) prototype managed by Statistics New 
Zealand. Confidence intervals in the middle panel are calculated based on bootstrap standard errors (100 replications, 
sampled at the firm level prior to propensity estimation). 
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Table 1: Jobseeker analysis: Characteristics of participants and non-participants   
Non-participants Participants
Number of observations 285,339 39,885
Demographic characteristics
Average age 38.3 31.0
Male 40.9 65.5
No school qualifcations 14.8 20.8
Tertiary qualifactions 4.1 4.4
Highest qualifaction not specified 12.3 0.2
Maori 23.9 31.4
Pacific 8.9 9.1
Partnered 18.8 13.8
Have dependant children 37.2 22.1
Migrant 5.3 3.7
Benefit type
Domestic Purposes 26.2 11.0
Independent Youth 0.7 1.8
Invalids 18.7 5.3
Sickness 15.5 7.4
Unemployment 33.4 66.8
Training 1.7 7.1
Program participation in the last three years
Training Incentive Allowance 8.9 6.1
Training Opportinities 6.5 20.7
Wage subsidy 3.5 13.0
Wage subsidy 1.5 3.6
Current benefit duration
Not on benefit in month started subsidised work 30.3 4.6
Less than 3 months 6.1 16.6
Ten years or more 15.0 5.3
Median current benefit duration (months) 14.0 10.2
Average number of months on benefit in the previous 
12 months 8.8 9.0
Benefit history over the last 10 years
Median cumulative benefit duration (years) 5.1 3.8
Cummulative duration less than 12 months 4.6 4.6
Cummulative duration of 6 -< 10 years 29.0 28.5
On benefit for the last 10 years 15.0 4.8
Employment and earnings history
Number of months on employed and off-benefit in the previous 12 months 1.7 1.6
Median monthly earnings (while employed and off-benefit) in the previous 
24 months 1,862 1,683
 
Notes: All counts have been randomly rounded to base 3. Figures have been derived from the Integrated Data 
Infrastructure (IDI) prototype managed by Statistics New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Labour Employment and Work in New Zealand 2012        12 
Table 2: Jobseeker analysis: Estimated impacts on participants three years after starting a subsidised job 
N
Receiving 
benefit
36 months 
later
Employed
36 months
later 
Employed 
and
off-benefit 
36 months 
later
Number of 
months 
receiving 
benefit over 
the following 
36 months 
Number of 
months 
employed 
over the 
following 
36 months 
Number of 
months 
employed 
and
off-benefit 
over the 
following
36 months 
Average 
total 
earnings 
over the 
following
36 months 
Total 38,808 -10.2 12.8 13.0 -5.0 4.8 6.1 20,150          
Benefit Type
Domestic Purposes 4,251   -16.5 15.0 16.8 -7.7 5.7 7.8 24,780          
Invalids 2,028   -12.2 22.9 13.9 -4.2 7.7 4.7 20,240          
Independent Youth 597      #-5.7 #5.4 #5.2 -4.4 3.3 4.5 13,470          
Sickness 2,883   -9.9 12.8 11.9 -4.9 5.6 6.0 21,650          
Training 2,628   -13.0 12.8 14.3 -6.3 5.4 7.3 24,030          
Unemployment 26,334 -8.8 11.8 12.4 -4.5 4.3 5.8 18,950          
Age
16-17 years 567      #-6.8 #5.4 #6.6 -4.4 3.4 4.6 14,496          
18-19 years 5,061   -9.3 10.1 10.8 -4.0 3.7 5.0 15,783          
20-24 years 9,381   -8.4 10.2 10.6 -4.0 3.7 5.1 16,187          
25-34 years 9,951   -7.5 11.4 10.9 -4.3 4.4 5.6 19,166          
35-44 years 7,722   -12.0 13.9 14.5 -5.9 5.5 6.9 23,327          
45-54 years 4,329   -14.5 17.3 18.1 -7.0 6.3 8.0 26,726          
55-64 years 1,356   -15.5 23.7 24.0 -8.0 8.7 10.1 32,987          
Sex
Male 25,530 -9.3 13.0 12.9 -4.6 4.9 6.0 20,637          
Female 13,278 -11.9 12.4 13.1 -5.7 4.6 6.3 19,204          
Ethnicity
Asian 1,263   -14.1 17.3 18.1 -6.3 6.6 7.9 25,788          
European 17,754 -9.9 13.8 13.8 -4.8 4.9 6.2 20,651          
Maori 15,297 -10.2 11.2 11.7 -5.1 4.4 5.7 18,965          
Pacific 3,465   -8.6 11.2 11.3 -4.6 4.4 5.8 18,949          
Other 831      -14.2 18.2 17.6 -6.6 6.9 7.8 26,482          
Current duration
< 6 months 13,092 -4.6 9.0 9.1 -2.0 2.6 3.9 13,469          
6-<24 months 13,497 -10.5 11.5 12.6 -5.6 4.8 6.6 21,502          
2-<4 years 4,554   -13.7 14.7 15.7 -7.3 6.7 8.0 26,011          
4 years + 6,465   -19.0 21.0 19.9 -8.1 7.6 8.3 26,994           
Notes: All counts have been randomly rounded to base 3. Figures have been derived from the Integrated Data 
Infrastructure (IDI) prototype managed by Statistics New Zealand. Dollar figures are expressed in March 2009 dollars. 
The term ‘employed’ refers to unsubsidised employment. Average monthly earnings is conditional on having non-zero 
earnings in the month. Average total earnings includes months with no earnings and includes earnings from subsidised 
employment. All estimates are significant at the 5% level, unless indicated by a hash (#). Statistical significance is 
calculated based on bootstrap standard errors (100 replications, sampled at the individual level prior to propensity 
estimation). 
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Table 3: Firm analysis: Characteristics of treatment and comparison group (size ≤ 50 employees)  
 
Notes: All counts have been randomly rounded to base 3. Figures have been derived from the Integrated Data 
Infrastructure (IDI) prototype managed by Statistics New Zealand.  
 
Table 4: Firm analysis:  Summary of average effects of treatment on the treated 
12
months 
later
Mean total 
empl.
ATT 
(Subs. 
empl.)
Subsidy 
starts
ATT 
(Other 
hires)
ATT
(total 
empl.)
ATT
 (total 
empl.)
ATT
(total 
empl.)
11.7 0.2 1.09 0.48 1.39 0.82 0.52
(0,2] 0.0 1.04 0.15 0.96 0.6 0.43
(2,5] 0.1 1.05 0.22 1.04 0.49 0.29
(5,10] 0.1 1.08 0.43 1.28 0.61 #0.22
(10,20] 0.3 1.12 0.63 1.62 0.96 0.74
(20,50] 0.5 1.17 0.96 2.1 1.54 #1.0531.8
All (emp ≤ 50)
Employment size class 
1.5
3.6
7.5
14.7
In month prior to 
subsidy start
In month of subsidy start
36 
months 
later
 
Notes: All counts have been randomly rounded to base 3. Figures have been derived from the Integrated Data 
Infrastructure (IDI) prototype managed by Statistics New Zealand.. All estimates are significant at the 5% level, unless 
indicated by a hash (#). Statistical significance is calculated based on bootstrap standard errors (100 replications, 
sampled at the firm level prior to propensity estimation). 
 
